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Abstract
This paper1 proposes, for the first time, the use of
re-encryption scheme to improve users privacy in a
privacy-enhancing system. Firstly, a secure protocol to
distribute a re-encryption key from a user A to a ser-
vice provider B, with the help of n referees, is pro-
posed. Next, this re-encryption key distribution protocol
is combined with an existing private credential system to
provide a protocol for conditional revocation of private
information. This protocol has a strong accountability
property with efficient online performance. It does not
assume the existence of a single trusted entity. We toler-
ate up to t dishonest referees (t ≤ n − 1), while A and
B are dishonest and do not trust each other.
1. Introduction
Privacy is an increasingly important requirement in
identity management systems. Consider a scenario
where a user A is interacting with a service provider B
who sells goods online. In a privacy enhancing environ-
ment, A can be conditionally anonymous. For security
and accountability purposes, B needs an assurance that
under certain conditions (such as in a situation whereby
B realizes that the goods sold have serious health and
safety concerns and therefore needs to contact A), B can
obtain the necessary private information about A so that
appropriate corrective actions can be taken. We call this
scenario conditional revelation of private information -
CRPI [2].
The private credential system (PCS) [2, 10] has been
proposed to address such a scenario. The PCS approach
is to encrypt private information in such a way that only
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a trusted third party (also known as the anonymity revo-
cation manager - ARM ) can decrypt the escrowed pri-
vate information when a set of conditions attached to
the encrypted text is satisfied, and B can verify that the
encrypted text (which was encrypted under the ARM ’s
public key) contains the correct private information that
has been certified by some trusted entities without learn-
ing the value of the private information itself. We call
such encryption verifiable.
These cryptographic schemes demonstrate that cryp-
tographic primitives can be usefully applied to the CRPI
problem. However, they place too much trust on ARM .
An ARM may decrypt the escrowed information, even
when the attached conditions remain unfulfilled: the at-
tached conditions are not enforceable except through the
‘trust’ that the ARM can properly and honestly assess
the fulfillment of the attached conditions.
One attempt to address such a trust problem is pro-
posed in [20] whereby PCS is combined with univer-
sal custodian-hiding verifiable encryption (UCHVE) -
we henceforth call this approach UCHVE-PCS. The
UCHVE-PCS approach in [20] distributes the trust be-
tween the ARM and a set of referees. However, the
UCHVE-PCS approach [20] has accountability and effi-
ciency problems. If A’s private information is misused,
it is not clear as to who is responsible for such misuse be-
cause the UCHVE-PCS approach allows any one of the
referees, ARM or B to learn A’s private information.
In addition, UCHVE-PCS [20] suffers from severe com-
putational inefficiency due to the large number of online
modular exponentiations that need to be performed.
This paper proposes a new mechanism to improve the
UCHVE-PCS approach [20] by using an existing proxy
re-encryption (PRE) scheme proposed by Ateniese et
al (2006) [1]. PRE has been used in the area of se-
cure file storage, access control, and delegations. To
our knowledge, this is the first time that PRE has been
used to enhance privacy and improve accountability in
a privacy-enhancing environment (such as CRPI) where
parties mutually distrust each other. Informally, PRE
allows an entity (such as a proxy) that possesses a re-
encryption key from A to B (denoted as rkA→B) to
transform a ciphertext Ciphera (which was originally
encrypted for A) to another ciphertext Cipherb, which
can be directly decrypted by B without the proxy learn-
ing anything about the content of Ciphera. Details of
the re-encryption scheme [1] are provided in section 2.2
However, the PRE scheme [1] cannot be readily ap-
plied to solve the CRPI scenario. The PRE scheme [1]
assumes that the proxy is trusted and will not abuse its
power to re-encrypt ciphertexts. Such assumption of a
trusted third party is precisely what we do not want to
have. Therefore, in order to use PRE, we need to firstly
propose a protocol to securely distribute a one-time re-
encryption key rkA→B . Then, we propose a method to
combine PRE with PCS to remove the need of a single
trusted entity (such as ARM ), and to provide better ac-
countability and efficiency as compared to the UCHVE-
PCS approach [20].
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are:
• A new protocol that provides the secure release of
re-encryption key rkA→B for PRE scheme [1] - we
henceforth call this protocol the Re-encryption Key
Distribution protocol (RKD). RKD adds to the ex-
isting PRE scheme [1] by providing a secure way to
distribute the re-encryption key (in [1], no protocol
is provided on how a re-encryption key should be
distributed). Informally, the approach proposed in
RKD is to hide the value of rkA→B by splitting it
into two values. To reconstruct, a secret is needed
which can only be released when at least t+ 1 ref-
erees agree to do so.
• A method to apply the RKD protocol with PCS so
that it removes the need for a single trusted entity,
and provides better accountability and efficiency.
We henceforth call this combination RKD-PCS.
• A performance evaluation of RKD-PCS to show
that it is more efficient than the UCHVE-PCS ap-
proach [20].
Application RKD-PCS can be usefully applied in en-
vironments where privacy is important, such as in the
2The PRE schemes should not be confused with the more generic
notion of re-encryption whereby a ciphertext is simply encrypted mul-
tiple times (and therefore require multiple decryptions to obtain the
original plaintext). Nor should this PRE be confused with the more
generic universal re-encryption scheme [15] whereby it simply re-
randomizes the ciphertext
medical field. Users generally prefer to be anonymous
and have their health information private, while at the
same time, certain conditions - such as when a user has
been diagnosed with highly infectious disease - require
the user’s anonymity and private information to be re-
voked. In addition, we also want to ensure the account-
ability of such revocation capability action to prevent
abuse. RKD-PCS provides the necessary properties to
be applicable in such an environment.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 de-
scribes the cryptographic primitives that RKD uses.
Section 3 describes the RKD protocol. Section 4 deliv-
ers the second contribution of this paper: the details of
RKD-PCS system. Section 5 delivers the third contribu-
tion of this paper: performance evaluation of RKD-PCS.
A conclusion is provided in section 6.
2. Cryptographic Schemes and Notations
The cryptographic schemes that will be used in RKD
are briefly explained. Readers who are interested in the
details, including security proofs, should refer to the
original papers referenced.
Notation ma,mb...mj are plaintext data items.
Cipherscheme−mi = Encscheme(mi;K
i
pubscheme
)
is an encryption of a data item mi using the
Encscheme encryption scheme under i’s public
encryption key. The plaintext can only be recov-
ered by i who has the corresponding private key:
mi = Decscheme(Cipherscheme−mi ;K
i
privscheme
). A
signature Smi over a message mi can only be produced
using i’s private signing key: Smi = Sign(mi;Kisign).
Anybody can verify the signature using the public veri-
fication key of i: V erifySign(Smi ;mi;Kiverify) = 1
(valid) or 0 (invalid).
Let a mapping e : G1 x G1 → G2 is bilinear if:
(1) G1, G2 are both of the same prime order q, (2) for
all a, b ∈ Zq , g ∈ G1, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab, and (3)
the map is non-degenerate: if G1 = 〈g〉, then G2 =
〈e(g, g)〉.
2.1. Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
A proxy re-encryption scheme allows a proxy that
possesses the appropriate re-encryption key rkX→Y to
transform a ciphertext that was originally encrypted for
an entity X , to the one that can be decrypted by an-
other entity Y , but reveals nothing about the plaintext
to the proxy. Normally, we call X the delegator and Y
the delegatee. A delegator supplies the appropriate re-
encryption key to the proxy.
There are several re-encryption schemes, such as [1,
5, 11, 17, 18, 21]. In this paper, the RKD is based on the
proxy re-encryption scheme proposed in [1].3
A brief description of the re-encryption scheme pro-
posed in [1] is provided: the system parameters for the
PRE scheme [1] are random generators g ∈ G1 and Z =
e(g, g) ∈ G2. X’s public keys are pkx = (Zx1 , gx2),
and the secret keys skx = (x1, x2). The value gx2 is
only needed when X is willing to be a delegatee. Also
assume a delegatee Y with the public keys (Zy1 , gy2)
and secret keys sky = (y1, y2). Knowing gy2 , X can
generate a re-encryption key rkX→Y : (gy2)x1 .
There are two types of encryptions in this scheme:
first-level and second-level encryption. A message en-
crypted using the first-level encryption algorithm can
only be decrypted by X , therefore, it cannot be re-
encrypted. A message encrypted using the second-level
encryption algorithm can be decrypted by X and can be
re-encrypted to a delegatee (such as Y ). To do first-level
encryption of a message m ∈ G2 under pkx, compute
Cipher1stPRE−m = (Z
x1k,mZk). Cipher1stPRE−m
can only be decrypted by X who knows skx, and it can-
not be re-encrypted. To do a second-level encryption of
m, compute Cipher2ndPRE−m = (gk,mZx1k).
A proxy who has Cipher2ndPRE−m and knows
gx1y2 can re-encrypt Cipher2ndPRE−m to be
Y ’s first-level encryption as follows: compute
e(gk, gx1y2) = Zx1y2k, and output the re-encrypted
ciphertext CipherPREX→Y −m = (Zx1y2k,mZx1k) =
(α, β). Y who knows the value of y2 can decrypt
CipherPREX→Y −m by compute m = β/(α)1/y2 .
Such re-encryption scheme is single-hop: a re-
encrypted message must be in its first-level encryption
format, and therefore cannot be re-encrypted further.
This single-hop property is criticized in [11] as a lim-
itation. However, in some applications - such as in a
privacy-enhanced environment, the single-hop property
is very useful as an assurance that a re-encrypted mes-
sage can only be decrypted by the chosen delegatee, not
anybody else.
2.2. Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing
Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme
[14] is as follows: assume a secret s which is ‘dis-
tributed’ to n participants by giving each participant a
3We use the ‘third attempt’ version of the scheme. The later
‘temporary unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme’ uses a trusted
server, which is inapplicable in this paper
‘share’ of the secret. To construct the secret s, any t+ 1
out of n (t ≤ n − 1) shares have to be collected before
s can be reconstructed. Any t or less will not reveal any
valuable information of s.
The public parameters required to share s is a group
Zq with prime order q, and g ∈ Zq. To share s
so that any t + 1 participants can reconstruct it, com-
pute a random polynomial of degree t: Q(x) = a0 +
a1x + a2x
2 + ... + atx
t
, where a0 = s. Then
compute the commitments: ri = gai mod p for
i = 0, 1, ..., t. The values r0, r1, ..., rt are made pub-
lic. Each participant j (j = 1, 2, ..., n) is given a
share calculated as: sj = Q(j). Each participant
j can verify that it has received a correct share w.r.t
s by verifying that gsj = (r0)(r1)j(r2)j
2
...(rt)
jt =
(ga0)(ga1j)(ga2j
2
)...(gatj
t
) = gQ(j) mod p. As long
as there are at least t+1 of the shares, s can be recovered
using the Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm [19].
An interesting property of Feldman’s VSS scheme is
that the value of r0 = ga0 = gs is known to the pub-
lic. While this has been criticized as a weakness (since
r0 leaks information about s), as we shall see in RKD,
this is the property we want. While r0 leaks information
about s, the value of s still cannot be recovered due to
the hardness of the discrete log problem.
3. A New Re-encryption Key Distribution
Protocol (RKD)
The entities involved in RKD are: A - the delega-
tor, and whose re-encryption key rkA→B is to be pro-
tected, B - the delegatee, and a group of referees R. As
the existing PRE scheme [1] provides no details on how
rkA→B can be distributed, RKD is thus proposed to fill
this gap.
RKD allows a re-encryption key rkA→B for the PRE
scheme in [1] to be securely distributed from A to B,
therefore removing the need for a trusted ‘proxy’ (the
entity who knows rkA→B). RKD has two stages: the
Initiation stage, which is used to distribute some infor-
mation required to form the re-encryption key amongst
B and the referees (note that step 1 to 3 of the RKD Initi-
ation stage are not part of the existing PRE scheme [1]),
and the Construction stage, which is used to construct
the re-encryption key rkA→B from the information dis-
tributed earlier.
3.1. Security Requirements of RKD
For RKD, we use the well-known basic security re-
quirements based on [4], with slight modifications:
• Main requirement:
– Implicit key authentication: this property is
achieved when A is assured that only B can
form the re-encryption key rkA→B .
• Desirable requirements:
– Known-key security: in a session, this prop-
erty is achieved when implicit key authentica-
tion is still attainable in the face of adversaries
who manage to learn the previous sessions re-
encryption keys.
– Unknown key-share security: an adversary C
must not be able to deceive A into believing
that he is distributing the re-encryption key to
B, while it is actually C whom A is distribut-
ing the key to.
– Forward secrecy: if long-term private keys of
the entities are compromised, the secrecy of
the previous encrypted messages are not af-
fected. Half forward secrecy is the situation
whereby the adversary only compromises one
entity’s private key.
– key-compromise impersonation security: if an
adversary C obtains B’s long term private
key, it is obvious that C can impersonate as
B. However, this property states that in such
a situation, C must not be able to impersonate
as another party D to B.
As RKD involves the referees, and as A and B do not
trust each other, few additional requirements are needed:
• Zero-knowledge Referee: referees must not learn
any information for the purpose of forming other
re-encryption keys with A as the delegator.
• Correctness: B must be able to verify A’s correct
behavior as per the protocol, that is, we do not want
A to be able to behave in such a way that the re-
encryption key cannot be correctly generated by
B even after B is authorized to do so. By ‘au-
thorized’, we mean the situation where there are
t + 1 referees who agree that B can generate the
re-encryption key.
• Private key secrecy: we do not want B (or the
referees) to learn the value of ska because know-
ing such value defeats the accountability property
that RKD provides (detailed discussion in section
4.2.5). While ska by definition is private, a badly
designed RKD may, as a result unintentionally re-
veal ska to B (recall that a re-encryption key con-
tains information of A’s private key).
We assume the following RKD threat environment:
• Dishonest B who will attempt to obtain the re-
encryption key rkA→B whenever it can.
• DishonestA (user) who may provide false informa-
tion such that rkA→B cannot be formed properly
• Honest referees (Rh ⊂ R) with a small subset of
at most t (t ≥ 1) dishonest referees (Rdh ⊂ R,
Rh ∪ Rdh = R, Rh ∩ Rdh = ∅, Rdh << Rh).
Rdh may collude amongst themselves to try to
obtain enough information to generate a new re-
encryption key rkA→Rdh . Referees want to protect
their reputations.
A and B do not trust each other. We allow collusion
among dishonest referees. Dishonest referees may col-
lude with B. No collusion between A and B (or Rdh)
as such collusion is unlikely due to their conflicting in-
terests (A wants to protect his/her private information,
while B, and Rdh want to reveal such information).
3.2. RKD - Initiation stage
Assume A has the following public and private key
pair: pka = Za1 , ska = a1. B has the following
key pair: pkb = (Zb1 , gb2), ska = (b1, b2). The re-
encryption key rkA→B is therefore ga1b2 . We are not
concerned with A being a delegatee. We assume that A
uses pka, ska once only (see discussion about one-time
use requirement in section 3.4.1). We assume the use of
confidentiality- and integrity-protected communication
channels between entities. Refer to Figure 1.
1. A chooses a random number r ∈ Zq , and calculates
z0 = g
r and z1 = (gb2)a1/r.
2. A encrypts z0 and z1 using first-level PRE en-
cryption to B to generate Cipher1stPRE−z0 and
Cipher1stPRE−z1 . A sends both encrypted z0 and
z1 to B and indicates that the secret discrete log
value of z0 will be shared amongst n referees.
3. B who has the secret value b1 decrypts
Cipher1stPRE−z0 and Cipher1stPRE−z1 .
Then B, who also has the secret value b2,
verifies that e(z0, z1) = (Za1)b2 (that is:
e(z0, z1) = e(g
r, ga1b2/r) = e(g, g)a1b2r/r =
e(g, g)a1b2 = Za1b2 ). B also verifies that the
discrete log value of z0 is indeed r by calculating:
(z1)
1/b2 = (ga1b2/r)1/b2 = ga1/r. Then, pair
e(ga1/r, z0) = e(g
a1/r, gr) = e(g, g)a1r/r = Za1 .
(a) If the above verification succeeds, then B
only knows that the multiplication of the dis-
crete log value of z0 and z1 must result in
a1b2 while the value of a1 remains hidden
(due to the discrete log problem).
(b) If the above verification fails, stops.
4. A then shares the secret value r, in relation to z0
among n referees (here, we use the term prox-
ies and referees interchangeably). We can use the
Feldman’s VSS scheme to share the discrete log
of z0. In particular, we need to have the value of
r0 = g
r = z0, and that the value of r0, r1, ...rt that
A provides to all of the n referees are consistent.
(a) Let A generate a polynomial Q(x) of degree
t (with the value of a0 = r), and the commit-
ments: c0...t = r0, r1, ...rt (with the value of
r0 = g
a0 = gr).
(b) A publishes the commitments c0...t.
(c) For each referees refj (j = 1...n, t ≤ n− 1),
A generates the share sj accordingly, and
sends the share to each refj . A can option-
ally include a set of conditionsConditions to
specify the conditions which have to be satis-
fied before a referee is allowed to release the
given share.
(d) Each referee verifies the given share sj in
relation to the published commitments c0...t
according to Feldman’s VSS scheme (see
section 2.2). Each referee sends to A: a
statement stat = ‘statement that a correct
share is received’ + the signature: Sjstat =
Sign(stat, Conditions, c0...t;K
refereej
sign ). 4
(e) As soon as A receives at least t+1 statements
from the referees, A sends to B the t + 1 (or
more) signed statements from the referees.
5. For j = 1...n, B verifies: V erifySign
(Sjstat;stat,Conditions,c0...t;Krefereejverify ) = 1. If
there are at least t + 1 valid Sstat, then B knows
that there are at least t + 1 referees who can col-
laborate to recover the secret r. The referees never
4For better privacy protection, A can request the referees to gen-
erate Sstat using a secure group signature scheme. By doing so, B
will not learn, from receiving t+1 or more signatures in step 4(e), the
identities of the referees who have the shares.
learn the identity of B in the process. Therefore,
referees cannot easily collude with B.
3.3. RKD - Construction stage
1. B requests the referees to reconstruct r by multi-
casting the value of c0...t to all referees.
2. Each referee verifies if the Conditions attached to
the commitments c0...t is satisfied. If so, the referee
sends the share sj toB. Otherwise, a referee should
not send the share.
3. For j = 1...n, B verifies the given share s(j):
gsj = (r0)(r1)
j(r2)
j2 ...(rt)
jt
. As long as B re-
ceives t+ 1 valid shares, B can recover r.
4. B generates the re-encryption key rkA→B :
• Validate that e(zr1 , g) = Z(a1b2/r)×r =
Za1b2 . rkA→B is thus zr1 = g(a1b2/r)×r =
ga1b2
3.4. Security Analysis
The proposed RKD protocol achieves the implicit key
authentication, known-key security, unknown key-share
security, correctness, and zero-knowledge referee prop-
erties under the assumptions that the discrete log (DL)
and bilinear discrete log (BDL) problem are hard, and
that there are at most t dishonest referees. The half for-
ward secrecy property is also achieved. BDL problem
can be defined as follows: given (g, gx, gy), find z such
that e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)z .
The Correctness property of the RKD is achieved
simply due the bilinear map property: for all a, b ∈
Zq , g ∈ G1, e(g
a, gb) = e(g, g)ab. In step 3 of the Initi-
ation protocol, if A formed z0 and z1 correctly, then the
verification of e(z0, z1) = (Za1)b2 , and e(ga1/r, z0) =
Za1 must be successful. If A provides an incorrect
value of z′0 = gr
′ (r′ 6= r), then during verification, B
will detect: e(ga1/r, z′0) = e(g, g)a1r
′/r 6= Za1 (recall
that Za1 is publicly known). Similarly, if A provides a
badly formed z′1 = (gb2)a
′
1
/r (a′1 6= a1), then B will
also be able to detect it: e(z0, z′1) = e(gr, ga
′
1
b2/r) =
e(g, g)a
′
1
b2r/r = Za
′
1
b2 6= Za1b2 .
The zero-knowledge referee property is achieved due
to the Feldman’s VSS scheme - which in turn relies on
the hardness of discrete log (DL) problem. Given that
there are t dishonest referees, obtaining t number of the
shares reveals nothing about the secret. In RKD, obtain-
ing t shares reveals nothing about the value r in relation
to z0. Even if we relax the assumption, and assume that
Initiation
B A Referees(1...n)
Cipher1stPRE−z0 , Cipher1stPRE−z1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Decrypts and calculates: (z1)1/b2 = ga1/r
Verifies:e(z0, z1) = (Za1)b2 , e(ga1/r, z0) = Za1
For each referee, refj(j = 1...n) sends:
s(j)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verifies:gsj = (r0)(r1)j ...(rt)j
t
stat1...t+1,...n, S1...t+1...nstat←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
stat1...t+1,...n, S1...t+1...nstat←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verifies: S1...t+1...nstat
Construction:
B Referees(1...n)
Multicasts to referees: c0...t−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verifies fulfillment of Conditions
s(j)1...t+1,...n
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Recover r, and calculate: zr1 = ga1b2
Figure 1. Re-encryption Key Distribution
there are t + 1 or more dishonest referees, learning the
value r is not sufficient to generate rkA→B , or any other
re-encryption key. A referee needs to obtain the value of
ga1 in order to generate a new re-encryption key (such
as rkA→Rdh ). Knowing the value r gives no information
whatsoever about ga1 .
The private key secrecy property is achieved due to
the BDL assumption. Given z0 = ga1b2/r, and z1 = gr,
it is hard to find z such that e(z0, z1) = Zz . If B can
compute z = a1b2, then the value of a1 can be triv-
ially calculated, but this is equivalent to solving the BDL
problem.
The implicit key authentication property is also
achieved. Aside from A, the value of z1 is only known
to B as B is the only entity who possesses the pri-
vate key b1 needed to decrypt Cipher1stPRE−z1 and
Cipher1stPRE−z0 . Therefore, we know that only B
who knows the value of z1 and z0. The correctness prop-
erty implies that B must have received a well-formed
z0 and z1 and the zero-knowledge referee states that the
referees cannot learn any useful information for the pur-
pose of generating rkA→B or any other re-encryption
keys. Therefore, A can be assured that when t+1 shares
are provided, it is B and only B who can correctly gen-
erate the re-encryption key rkA→B by calculating zr1 .
The known-key security property is achieved due to
the fact that A uses a different key pair pka/ska for
every session. Assume that for the previous l ses-
sions, A used the value of a11, a21, ..., al1 with B. These
keys will result in a set of re-encryption keys: RK =
ga
1
1
b2 , ga
2
1
b2 , ..., ga
l
1
b2
. An adversary C who managed to
obtain the set RK still does not have any useful infor-
mation to upset the implicit key authentication property
because at the next session l + 1, A will use a new ran-
dom value of al+11 .
The unknown key share security property is achieved
as long as the BDL problem is hard. Assume an ad-
versary C who manage to obtain the value of b1 from
Zb1 (B’s public key). C will then be able to decrypt
Cipher1stPRE−z1 , and obtain z1, while A will still
think that he/she is establishing the key with B. How-
ever, obtaining the value of b1 from Zb1 is equivalent to
breaking the well-known hard BDL problem.
The half forward secrecy property is achieved as
long as it is B’s long term secret key b1 that is be-
ing compromised. If an adversary C obtains b1, then
C can at most only decrypt a set of Cipher1...l1stPRE−z1
and Cipher1...l1stPRE−z0 . Knowing z
1...l
0 and z1...l1 is
not enough to generate the corresponding re-encryption
keys rk1...lA→B , as C needs the corresponding value of
r1...l (which cannot be obtained from z1...l0 due to the
DL problem).
However, RKD does not provide half forward secrecy
property if the value of the long term private key b2 is
learned by C. Knowing b2, C can decrypt all previ-
ously re-encrypted messages using the re-encryption key
rk1...lA→B . A does not have any long term key, therefore,
forward secrecy property does not apply to A’s keys.
The key-compromise impersonation security is
achieved. Assume an adversaryC who managed to learn
B’s long term private keys b1 and b2 (A does not have
long term keys). C does not gain any significant advan-
tage for the purpose of impersonating as another user D
to B. Assume there is another user D with the following
public/private key pair: pka = Zd1 , ska = d1. C, who
knows b1, b2, wants to impersonate as D to B. As per
RKD, C now has to form z′1 = gd1b2/r. Knowing the
value of b2 does not give C any advantage in forming z′1
as the value gb2 is already public. What C needs to im-
personate as D is the value of d1, and obtaining d1 from
Zd1 is equivalent to solving BDL problem.
Now assume that C can intercept communication be-
tween D and B that results in C obtaining the encrypted
value of z′1, and z′0. C who knows b1 can perform cor-
rect decryption and obtains the value of z′1 = gd1b2/r,
and z′0 = gr. Again, even at this situation, C still cannot
impersonate D to B because C cannot obtain the value
of r or d1b2/r due to the DL problem. If C can solve
the DL problem, then B can obtain the value of r, and
d1b2/r. C can then calculate r × (d1b2/r)/b2 and ob-
tains d1. Nevertheless, as DL problem is hard, so this
impersonation is not possible.
3.4.1 One-time Re-encryption Key
At the end of RKD, the value of rkA→B is revealed toB.
Consequently, B can now re-encrypt and then decrypt
all of A’s 2nd-level encrypted messages (recall that 2nd-
level encrypted messages using the PRE scheme pro-
posed by Ateniese 2006 [1] can be re-encrypted, while
1st-level encrypted messages cannot - see section 2.1).
Therefore, it is crucial that A only uses the key pair
pka, ska once only. This may appear to be a limitation,
however, as we are operating in a privacy-enhancing en-
vironment, such one-time key use requirement is almost
inevitable in order to achieve unlinkability property be-
tween session: if A uses the same public key to encrypt
messages over multiple sessions, then it is trivial to link
these sessions to the same user A. Therefore, using a
one-time re-encryption key pair is in fact essential in a
privacy-enhancing environment.
4. Using RKD with PCS for Conditional
Revelation of Private Data Items
In this section, we show how we can use RKD with
PCS. First, we briefly describes PCS in more detail, in-
cluding the additional notations. Next, we show how
RKD can be applied to the PCS scheme explained ear-
lier, and show the advantages and disadvantages of this
approach as compared to the UCHVE-PCS approach
[20] in terms of security and performance.
More Notation A commitment cmi of a data item mi
is generated using a Commit algorithm, along with a
random value r: cmi = Commit(mi, r). A commit-
ment is hiding if it does not show any computational in-
formation on mi, and binding if it is computationally
impossible to find another m′i and r
′
as inputs to the
same Commit algorithm that gives a value c′mi = cmi .
PK{(ma): F (ma,mb...mi) = 1} refers to a zero
knowledge proof interactive protocol (PK). PK is ex-
ecuted between a Prover and a Verifier. The data on the
left of the colon ma is the data item that a Prover needs
to prove the knowledge of such that the statements on the
right side of the colon, F (ma,mb...mi) = 1, is correct.
A verifier will not learn the data on the left hand side of
the colon, while other parameters are known. The actual
protocol involves one or more message exchange(s). At
the end of the protocol, a verifier will be convinced (or
not) that the prover has the knowledge ofma without the
verifier learning it.
4.1. Private Credential System
The private credential system (PCS) proposed in
[2,10] provides many useful privacy-enhancing services.
For the purpose of this paper, only the ‘conditional rev-
elation of private data items’ is elaborated.
In PCS, unlike the ‘usual’ certificate (such as X509
certificate), a certificate Cert1 issued to a user ua is a
signature of CertificateIssuer1 over a collection of
data items (ma,mb, ...mj) using one of the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature schemes [7, 8]:
Cert1 = Sign(ma,mb, ...mj ;K
CertificateIssuer1
sign ). A
user ua should keep Cert1 private.
The conditional revelation of these private data
items (ma, ...mj) is accomplished as follows:
assume we need to escrow private data items
ma...me, and reveal mf ...mj to B. The data
items ma...me are blinded using a commitment
scheme, for example, ca = Commit(ma, r). Then,
each of the value ma...me (which are hidden in
ca...ce) is encrypted using the Camenisch-Shoup
verifiable encryption scheme (CSVE) [9] under the
ARM public encryption key, along with a set of
pre-determined Conditions: CipherCSV E−ma =
EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;K
ARM
public−CSV E) (similar
operation applied to mb...me). Then, a PK is executed
to prove that ca...ce are the commitments for ma...me
contained in Cert1 issued by CertificateIssuer1 (this
is achieved by using the proof of knowledge of a signa-
ture on committed messages technique based on one of
the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature schemes [7, 8]
depending on which signature scheme was used to
generate Cert1 is - see [7, 8] for details). This PK
also proves that CipherCSV E−ma ...CipherCSV E−me
are encryption of ma...me hidden in ca...ce, under the
ARM public key:
PK{(Cert1,ma...me) : ca = Commit(ma, r)∧
cb = Commit(mb, r) ∧ ...∧
V erifySign(ma, ..,mj ;K
CertificateIssuer1
verify ) = 1∧
CipherCSV E−ma =
EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;K
ARM
public−CSV E) ∧ ...∧
CipherCSV E−me =
EncCSV E(me;Conditions;K
ARM
public−CSV E)} (1)
Protocol (1) allows a user to provide a veri-
fiable encryption of ma...me without the verifier
learning its value and still be convinced that the
ciphertexts contain the correct value. However,
CipherCSV E−ma ...CipherCSV E−me can be trivially
decrypted by the ARM without the user’s knowledge,
and there is no enforcement of Conditions fulfillment.
Our RKD protocol, combined with the existing PCS,
seeks to rectify this problem.
4.2. Applying RKD to PCS
In this section, we show how RKD can be combined
with PCS to improve its conditional revelation of pri-
vate data items capability. RKD-PCS consists of the
setup stage, private information escrow stage, key es-
crow stage, and finally the revocation stage.
4.2.1 Setup
For the purpose of this paper, consider that a user A has
Cert1 whichB accepts as a source of the user’s personal
information. Cert1 is verified using the verification
key KCertifcateIssuer1verify . Cert1 contains ma,mb, ...mj .
It is assumed that A and B have agreed on a set of
Conditions before starting the protocol. The Condi-
tions should include a one-time unique value so that
each set of Conditions is unique.
4.2.2 Private Information Escrow
This stage is similar to the one in PCS explained in sec-
tion 4.1, except that the user A’s private information that
is escrowed is encrypted using a one-time key chosen by
A, instead of ARM ’s. Assume we need to escrow data
items ma and mb:
1. The user A:
(a) Generates a random number r1 and r2,
commit: ca = Commit(ida, r), ca =
Commit(ma, r1), cb = Commit(mb, r2).
(b) Generates a one-time key pair for CSVE
scheme [9]: (KApubCSV E ,KAprivCSV E )
(c) Encrypts ma and mb: CipherCSV E−ma =
EncCSV E(ma;Conditions;K
A
publicCSV E
),
CipherCSV E−mb =
EncCSV E(mb;Conditions;K
A
publicCSV E
)
(d) Sends KApubCSV E to B
2. A and B engage in PK to verify that ca and cb
are commitments of ma and mb from Cert1, and
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb are en-
cryption of ma and mb under KApubCSV E (ca and
cb are made available to B as part of this PK)
At this point, B has the correct ciphertexts that hide ma
and mb, but these ciphertexts cannot be decrypted as B
does not have the corresponding private key KAprivCSV E .
4.2.3 Key Escrow
As per the key specifications of the CSVE scheme
[9], KAprivCSV E is composed of three components:
x1, x2, x3, each one of them is related to the public keys
in a discrete log relationship: y1 = gx1 , y2 = gx2 ,
y3 = g
x3 (g, x1,2,3 and several other public key compo-
nents are chosen according to the key generation algo-
rithm detailed in [9]).
At this stage, we want to escrow KAprivCSV E by
having A encrypt x1, x2, x3 using the PRE scheme
[1]: CipherPRE−x1 = EncPRE(x1;KApublicP RE )(similar operations applies for CipherPRE−x2 and
CipherPRE−x3 . However, we have to make
the PRE scheme verifiable to convince B that
CipherPRE−V EPS−x1,2,3 are proper encryptions of
x1, x2, x3 which are the discrete log values of y1, y2, y3.
For the sake of simplicity, we can make PRE scheme
verifiable by encrypting x1, x2, x3 using PRE scheme
and provide the corresponding proofs of correct encryp-
tion generated according to the verifiable encryption
scheme proposed in [6]. 5 Such proofs can be executed
in a non-interactive fashion.
Therefore, x1, x2, x3 are escrowed as follows:
1. A generates another one-time key pair for the PRE
scheme. Public keys: KApublicP RE = (Z
a1 , ga2),
and the secret keys: KAprivP RE = (a1, a2)
2. A encrypts x1, x2, x3 using the PRE scheme and
generate the proof according to [6]:
CipherPRE−x1,2,3 =
EncPRE(x1,2,3;K
A
publicP RE
) + Proofs.
3. A sends CipherPRE−x1,2,3 + Proofs to B
4. B verifies that CipherPRE−x1,2,3 are correct en-
cryptions of x1, x2, x3 using the provided Proofs.
5. Start the Initiation part of the RKD protocol
4.2.4 Revocation
For revocation of the escrowed private information, the
following steps are performed:
1. B initiates the Construction phase of RKD
2. Once B obtains the re-encryption key, B can re-
encrypt CipherPRE−x1,2,3 to generate
CipherPREA→B−x1,2,3 , which can now be de-
crypted by B to obtain x1, x2, x3.
3. Once x1, x2, x3 are obtained (that is, KAprivCSV E ),
decrypt CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb
to recover ma and mb.
4.2.5 Accountability Property in RKD-PCS
The accountability property of RKD-PCS is the result of
the zero-knowledge referees, implicit key authentication,
and correctness properties of RKD. The zero-knowledge
referee property allows the referees to be ‘free of re-
sponsibility’ as even when there are more than t + 1
dishonest referees, the knowledge of r reveals no infor-
mation about ga1 or a1 - this provides a disincentive for
5The verifiable encryption scheme proposed in [6] should not be
confused with CSVE scheme [9]. In CSVE, an encryption scheme
and the corresponding proof system (which is tied to that encryption
scheme only) is provided. However, in [6], a proof system which is
independent of any particular encryption scheme is proposed.
them to misbehave. The correctness and implicit key au-
thentication property means that as a result of executing
RKD,B can only generate rkA→B , and not any other re-
encryption key. Finally, the private key secrecy property
states that the value of a1 is never revealed.
These properties provide the strong basis that
the only person who can decrypt CipherPRE−x1,2,3
must be B as B is the only entity who can cal-
culate the re-encryption key rkA→B , thus forming
CipherPREA→B−x1,2,3 . This accountability prop-
erty gives an assurance that it is only B who can
learn the user’s escrowed private information (such as
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb). Referees as-
sist B. However, the referees do not learn any valuable
information in the process (in contrast to threshold en-
cryption scheme (such as [13]) whereby the referees can
learn the plaintext value as long as a certain threshold
is reached). This is an improvement from the UCHVE-
PCS approach [20] whereby no such accountability fea-
ture is provided.
Relaxing the Assumption We relax the assumption of
the referees by allowing t + 1 referees to be dishonest
and collude with B. We will show that, although the im-
plicit key authentication property is violated, RKD still
respects its strong accountability property.
Even if there are t + 1 malicious referees, they can
only obtain the value of r, which provides no informa-
tion on a1 or ga1 . However, when t+ 1 dishonest refer-
ees collude with B, then the implicit key authentication
property is violated: after obtaining the re-encryption
key ga1b2 , it is trivial for B to calculate (ga1b2)1/b2
and obtain ga1 . The value of ga1 can be given to the
dishonest referees who can then calculate various re-
encryption keys for themselves: if a dishonest referee
has pkdh = Zdh1 , gdh2 , and skdh = (dh1, dh2), then
the re-encryption key rkA→rdh is (ga1)dh2 .
Nevertheless, even in this situation, the accountabil-
ity of such misbehavior still rests on B: if other enti-
ties obtain the value of ga1 , then it must be B who have
leaked such information for the referees cannot obtain
such value by themselves. Such accountability protec-
tion is a strong deterrent forB to even want to start RKD
unless it really is necessary.
4.2.6 No Single Trusted Entity
We do not need a trusted ARM in RKD-PCS. We have
removed such trust requirement and distributed the trust
to n referees, allowing up to t dishonest referees.
4.3. Security Discussion
Applying RKD into PCS comes with some security
trade-offs. The most obvious one is that the combined
RKD-PCS system reduces the overall security of the en-
cryption schemes to CPA (Chosen Plaintext Attack) se-
curity only. This is because while the CSVE scheme
has CCA (Chosen Ciphertext Attack) security (which is
considered stronger than CPA), the PRE scheme is only
CPA-secure. Therefore, the overall security is reduced
to CPA-secure. However, it is important to note that
CPA-secure does not mean that it is insecure - it just
means that the scheme has lower security protection as
compared to CCA-secure schemes.
While there are few re-encryption schemes that pro-
vide CCA security, such as [11, 16], they are neverthe-
less unsuitable for the purpose of this paper. The ap-
proach used in [16] assumes the existence of a trusted
party that holds a master secret key - the very as-
sumption that this paper avoids. The design of the re-
encryption scheme in [11], while CCA secure, is not
suitable for the purpose of this paper, because the struc-
ture of the re-encryption key is such that if B knows the
value of the re-encryption key rkA→B , then it is trivial
forB to obtainA’s private key (in contrast to the scheme
proposed here, B can at most only recover ga1 , not a1 it-
self). While the re-encryption scheme proposed in [11]
also provides a method to distribute the re-encryption
key, this method assumes that A and B trust each other
- which is a weaker assumption than our paper.
Therefore, at this point, we may have to contend with
lowering the security protection to CPA security level,
in exchange of the benefits that RKD-PCS provides (ac-
countability, removal of single point of trust, better effi-
ciency). As research progresses on proxy re-encryption
schemes, it is very likely that a protocol, similar to RKD-
PCS but based on a CCA-secure re-encryption scheme,
can be proposed. Nevertheless, from a practical point
of view, the benefits that RKD provides may be more
beneficial than CCA security.
5. Efficiency Optimization and Performance
Evaluation of RKD-PCS
Without any optimization efforts, RKD-PCS is inef-
ficient due to the numerous cryptographic operations.
Fortunately, many of these operations can be performed
non-interactively offline, thus increasing the online effi-
ciency of the system.
In this section, some optimization efforts for RKD-
PCS protocol are explained. We will also compare how,
with these optimizations implemented, we can achieve
a better overall efficiency as compared to the UCHVE-
PCS approach [20]. The comparison baseline is on a
rough estimate of the number of additional online mod-
ular exponentiation (modex) and bilinear pairing (PA)
operations that have to be performed in comparison to
executing PCS only.
Assume we have d private data items to pro-
tect. During the private information escrow stage,
step 1(a) and 1(b) can be precomputed offline. Step
1(c)requires d verifiable encryption (CSVE) operations,
hence d(CSV E). Step 2 involves 2 proof of knowledge
(PK) operations for each data items: proving knowl-
edge of a signature on committed messages d(PK−C),
and proving valid encryption d(PKCSV EE). There-
fore, the online operations required at this stage are:
d(CSV E) + d(PK − C) + d(PK − CSV E) (2)
During the key escrow stage, many operations can
be performed offline. Step 1 can be performed off-
line. Step 2,3 and 4 involve the PRE encryption op-
erations with proofs to provide a verifiable encryp-
tion of the private keys x1, x2, x3. These steps can
be precomputed offline: A periodically generates one-
time key pair for CSVE and PRE schemes, and en-
crypts KAprivCSV E with K
A
publicP RE
, generates Proofs
for such encryption, and sends to B: KApublicCSV E ,
KApublicP RE , CipherPRE−x1,2,3 , and Proofs. B can
then verify these encryptions and store these values.
When a session is started between A and B, A sim-
ply uses one of the previously verified KApublicCSV E ,
KApublicP RE , and CipherPRE−x1,2,3 pair.
Step 5 of the key escrow stage (which is the Initiation
stage of the RKD) can also be optimized: step (1) and
(2) of the Initiation stage of RKD can be precomputed.
Similarly, step 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) of the Initiation stage
of RKD can also be precomputed. Step 3 requires B to
do 2 pairing operations, 2 modex and 2 PRE decryption
(PRE − Dec) operations. Step 4(d) requires each of
the n referees to verify the given share, therefore, for a
polynomial of degree t, there are roughly≈ n×t modex
(the value of j2...jt can be easily pre-computed). Each
referee also has to do one signing operation (giving a to-
tal of n signing operation). B has to verify all signatures
in step 5 of the Initiation stage of RKD (thus n signature
verification operations).
We assume that a signature and its verification re-
quire ≈ 1 modex. A PRE −Dec requires ≈ 1 modex.
Therefore, the required online operations during the key
escrow stage are:
2(PA) + (nt+ 2n+ 4)(modex) (3)
During the Revocation stage, step 1 is the Construc-
tion stage of the RKD. Looking at the Construction
stage of RKD, step 3 requires B to verify each re-
leased share s(j) (j = 1...n). Part of this step can
be precomputed as follows: the verification requires B
to verify that gsj = (r0)(r1)j(r2)j
2
...(rt)
jt
. During
the Initiation stage of RKD, A publishes the value of
r0, r1, ...rt. Therefore, B, knowing r0...rt, B can pre-
compute (r0)(r1)j(r2)j
2
...(rt)
jt for j = 1...n. Dur-
ing the Construction stage of RKD, B only needs to
do one modex gs(j) for each j = 1...n, and compare
that it is equal to the respective precomputed value of
(r0)(r1)
j(r2)
j2 ...(rt)
jt
. Therefore, the optimal scenario
is when B receives all valid shares from the referees,
thus only has to do t + 1 modex. The worst case sce-
nario is n modex. Step 4 requires B to do one PA and
one modex.
Back to the revocation stage, step 2 requires B to do
3 PRE re-encryption operation (PRE − Renc) and 3
PRE decryption (PRE − Dec) operations to recover
x1, x2, x3. Step 3 requires d decryption operations
CSV E − Dec to recover the escrowed private infor-
mation. A PRE −Renc requires ≈ one PA operation,
while a PRE−Dec requires ≈ one modex. Therefore,
during the revocation stage, we need a maximum of :
(n+ 4)(modex) + 4(PA) + d(CSV E −Dec) (4)
In total, adding (2), (3), (4), RKD-PCS requires the
following additional online operations:
d(CSV E) + d(PK − C) + d(PK − CSV E) +
6(PA) + (nt+ 3n+ 8)modex+
d(CSV E −Dec) (5)
Compare RKD-PCS with using PCS only, which only
require the information escrow stage and the decryption
of the escrowed information:
d(CSV E) + d(PK − C) +
d(PK − CSV E) + d(CSV E −Dec) (6)
Therefore, the number of additional operations that
RKD-PCS adds in comparison to using PCS alone are
simply the difference between equation (5) and (6):
6(PA) + (nt+ 3n+ 8)(modex) (7)
A breakdown of these additional online operations
required from using RKD-PCS between A, B, and the
referees is provided in Table 1. This table also provides
a comparison with the optimum required modex opera-
tions using the UCHVE-PCS approach [20].
From Table 1, it is evident that the UCHVE-PCS ap-
proach [20] suffers from uneven distribution of modex
operations - even for the optimum performance, the
ARM still has to perform t+ 13n+ 2 modex for every
session. In our approach, such bottleneck is avoided.
Instead, such bottleneck is resolved by having each of
the referees to perform a reasonable t+1 modex opera-
tions for each session (which gives the total of (nt+ n)
modex). More importantly, we do not require the user
A to perform any additional online modex or PA op-
erations. Of course A still has to perform d(CSV E) +
d(PK − C) + d(PK − CSV E) + d(CSV E − Dec)
operations, however, recent advancement in private cre-
dential system (such as [3]) provides the non-interactive
equivalent of PCS. Combining such scheme could po-
tentially allow A to not have to do any or very few online
modex - a beneficial property for users who use limited-
resources devices (such as hand-held devices).
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented RKD-PCS protocol that uses re-
encryption approach [1] to improving privacy. RKD-
PCS provides accountability and performance-efficient
properties. It also removes the need for a single trusted
entity. Future work will focus on improving RKD us-
ing a suitable proxy re-encryption scheme that is CCA-
secure. In addition, up to this point, we still rely on
referees to ‘manually’ and honestly verify the fulfill-
ment of Conditions. It is an interesting research area
to find methods to allow technically-enforceable Con-
ditions verification (similar to the concept of double-
spending in e-cash applications [12]) - thus removing
the need to rely on honest referees, or even the referees
themselves.
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